{"stig":{"title":"z/OS CA 1 Tape Management for RACF Security Technical Implementation Guide","version":"7","release":"2"},"checks":[{"vulnId":"V-224448","ruleId":"SV-224448r1144666_rule","severity":"medium","ruleTitle":"CA 1 Tape Management system password will be changed from the default.","description":"CA 1 Tape Management default system password is common with all CA 1 systems. With this password, CA 1 tape processing can be deactivated. This could allow for unauthorized access to information stored on tape volumes and the CA 1 Tape Management Catalog (TMC). The result may threaten the integrity and availability of the CA 1 Tape Management System, and compromise the confidentiality of customer data.","checkContent":"Refer to the following report produced by the z/OS Data Collection:\n\n- CA1RPT(TMSTMVT) - for r11.5 and below.\n- CA1RPT(TMOOPTxx) - for r12.0 and above.\n\nAutomated Analysis\nRefer to the following report produced by the z/OS Data Collection:\n\n- PDI(ZCA10041).\n\nFor r11.5 and below refer to offset x'18' from the beginning of module TMSTMVT. For r12.0 and above refer to the SHUTDWN option specified in the TMOOPTxx. The TMOOPTxx member is specified in the TMOSYSxx member in the data set allocated by the TMSPARM DD statement in the TMSINIT STC. If the default CA 1 system password is not being utilized, this is not a finding.\n\nNOTE: The default system password for CA 1 provided by CA is CA1(TMS). The default system passwords provided by SSO are SSOCA1DF and SSOC@1DF.","fixText":"The systems programmer/ISSO will ensure that the CA 1 system password is changed from the vendor default system password.\n\nVerify upon installation that the password is not the same as the default password and user distributed with the original installation default.\n\nFor r11.5 and below refer to offset x'18' from the beginning of module TMSTMVT.\n\nFor r12.0 and above refer to the SHUTDWN option specified in the TMOOPTxx. The TMOOPTxx member is specified in the TMOSYSxx member in the data set allocated by the TMSPARM DD statement in the TMSINIT STC.\n\nNOTE: The default system password for CA 1 provided by CA is CA1(TMS). The default system passwords provided by SSO are SSOCA1DF and SSOC@1DF.","ccis":["CCI-000381"]},{"vulnId":"V-224449","ruleId":"SV-224449r1144668_rule","severity":"medium","ruleTitle":"CA 1 Tape Management user exits, when in use, must be reviewed and/or approved.","description":"CA-1 Tape Management user exits, TMSUXnA and TMSUXnS, provide the capability to bypass or modify existing ACP controls. A review and evaluation of exit code must be performed to ensure that the integrity of the CA-1 processing environment is kept intact. Unauthorized usage of these exits may compromise the confidentiality and integrity of customer data.","checkContent":"Refer to the following report produced by the z/OS Data Collection:\n\n- CA1RPT(TMSCKLVL).\n\nDetermine if CA 1 user exits, TMSUXnA and TMSUXnS (for r11.5 and below) or TMSXITA and TMSXITS (for r12.0 and above) are active.\n\nIf both CA 1 user exits are not found, this is not a finding.\n\nIf one or both user exits are installed and the following requirements are true, this is not a finding:\n\nThe usage and function of the user exit(s) is fully documented.\nThe use of the user exit(s) is approved.\nAll associated documentation is on file with the ISSO.","fixText":"Ensure that the site ISSO has reviewed, evaluated, and approved the usage of CA 1 user exits, TMSUXnA and TMSUXnS (for r11.5 and below) or TMSXITA and TMSXITS (for r12.0 and above). If one or both user exits are installed and the following requirements will be followed:\n\nThe usage and function of the user exit(s) is fully documented.\n\nThe use of the user exit(s) is approved.\n\nAll associated documentation is on file with the ISSO.","ccis":["CCI-001744"]},{"vulnId":"V-224450","ruleId":"SV-224450r1144670_rule","severity":"medium","ruleTitle":"CA 1 Tape Management installation data sets must be properly protected.","description":"CA 1 Tape Management installation data sets have the ability to use privileged functions and/or have access to sensitive data. Failure to properly restrict access to these data sets could result in violating the integrity of the base product which could result in compromising the operating system or sensitive data.","checkContent":"Refer to the following report produced by the Data Set and Resource Data Collection:\n\n- SENSITVE.RPT(CA1PROD).\n\nAutomated Analysis\nRefer to the following report produced by the Data Set and Resource Data Collection:\n\n- PDI(ZCA10000).\n\nVerify that the accesses to the CA 1 Tape Management installation data sets are properly restricted. If the following guidance is true, this is not a finding.\n\nThe RACF data set rules for the data sets restricts READ access to all authorized users.\n\nThe RACF data set rules for the data sets restricts WRITE and/or greater access to systems programming personnel.\n\nThe RACF data set rules for the data sets specify that all (i.e., failures and successes) WRITE and/or greater access is logged.\n\nThe RACF data set rules for the data sets specify UACC(NONE) and NOWARNING.","fixText":"Ensure that WRITE and/or greater access to CA 1 Tape Management installation data sets is limited to systems programmers only, and all WRITE and/or greater access is logged. READ access can be given to all authorized users.\n\nThe installing systems programmer will identify and document the product data sets and categorize them according to who will have WRITE and/or greater access and if required that all WRITE and/or greater access is logged. The installing systems programmer will identify if any additional groups have WRITE and/or greater access for specific data sets, and once documented will work with the ISSO to see that they are properly restricted to the ACP (Access Control Program) active on the system.\n\nThe following is an example of the type of data sets to be protected:\nSYS2.CA1.\nSYS2A.CA1.*.CAILIB\nSYS2A.CA1.*.CAILPA\nOr\nSYS2A.CA1.*.CTAPLINK\nSYS3.CA1.\nSYS3A.CA1.*.CAILIB\nOr\nSYS3A.CA1.*.CTAPLINK\nSYS3A.CA1.*.CTAPLPA\n\nThe following commands are provided as a sample for implementing data set controls:\n\nAD 'sys2.ca1.v**' UACC(NONE) OWNER(SYS2) AUDIT(SUCCESS(UPDATE) FAILURES(READ))\nAD 'sys2a.ca1.v*.cailib.**' UACC(NONE) OWNER(SYS2A) AUDIT(SUCCESS(UPDATE) FAILURES(READ))\nAD 'sys2a.ca1.v*.cailpa.**' UACC(NONE) OWNER(SYS2A) AUDIT(SUCCESS(UPDATE) FAILURES(READ))\nOr\nAD 'sys2a.ca1.v*.ctaplink.**' UACC(NONE) OWNER(SYS2A) AUDIT(SUCCESS(UPDATE) FAILURES(READ))\nAD 'sys3.ca1.**' UACC(NONE) OWNER(SYS3) AUDIT(SUCCESS(UPDATE) FAILURES(READ))\nAD 'sys3a.ca1.v*.cailib.**' UACC(NONE) OWNER(SYS3A) AUDIT(SUCCESS(UPDATE) FAILURES(READ))\nOr\nAD 'sys3a.ca1.v*.ctaplink.**' UACC(NONE) OWNER(SYS3A) AUDIT(SUCCESS(UPDATE) FAILURES(READ))\nAD 'sys3a.ca1.v*.ctaplpa.**' UACC(NONE) OWNER(SYS3A) AUDIT(SUCCESS(UPDATE) FAILURES(READ))\n\nPE 'sys2.ca1.v**' ID(syspaudt) ACC(A)\nPE 'sys2.ca1.v**' ID(authorized users/*) ACC(R)\nPE 'sys2a.ca1.v*.cailib.**' ID(syspaudt) ACC(A)\nPE 'sys2a.ca1.v*.cailib.**' ID(authorized users/*) ACC(R)\nPE 'sys2a.ca1.v*.cailpa.**' ID(syspaudt) ACC(A)\nPE 'sys2a.ca1.v*.cailpa.**' ID(authorized users/*) ACC(R)\nOr\nPE 'sys2a.ca1.v*.ctaplink.**' ID(syspaudt) ACC(A)\nPE 'sys2a.ca1.v*.ctaplink.**' ID(authorized users/*) ACC(R)\nPE 'sys3.ca1.v**' ID(syspaudt) ACC(A)\nPE 'sys3.ca1.v**' ID(authorized users/*) ACC(R)\nPE 'sys3a.ca1.v*.cailib.**' ID(syspaudt) ACC(A)\nPE 'sys3a.ca1.v*.cailib.**' ID(authorized users/*) ACC(R)\nOr\nPE 'sys3a.ca1.v*.ctaplink.**' ID(syspaudt) ACC(A)\nPE 'sys3a.ca1.v*.ctaplink.**' ID(authorized users/*) ACC(R)\nPE 'sys3a.ca1.v*.ctaplpa.**' ID(syspaudt) ACC(A)\nPE 'sys3a.ca1.v*.ctaplpa.**' ID(authorized users/*) ACC(R)","ccis":["CCI-001499","CCI-002234"]},{"vulnId":"V-224451","ruleId":"SV-224451r1144673_rule","severity":"medium","ruleTitle":"CA-1 Tape Management STC data sets must be properly protected.","description":"CA-1 Tape Management STC data sets have the ability to use privileged functions and/or have access to sensitive data. Failure to properly restrict access to these data sets could result in violating the integrity of the base product which could result in compromising the operating system or sensitive data.","checkContent":"Refer to the following report produced by the RACF Data Collection and Data Set and Resource Data Collection:\n\n- SENSITVE.RPT(CA1STC).\n\nAutomated Analysis\nRefer to the following report produced by the Data Set and Resource Data Collection:\n\n- PDI(ZCA10001).\n\nVerify that the accesses to CA1 Tape Management Started Tasks (STCs) data sets are properly restricted. If the following guidance is true, this is not a finding.\n \nThe RACF data set access authorizations restrict READ access to auditors.\n\nThe RACF data set access authorizations restrict WRITE and/or greater access to systems programming personnel.\n\nThe RACF data set access authorizations restrict WRITE and/or greater access to CA1 Tape Management STCs and/or batch users.\n\nThe RACF data set access authorizations specify UACC(NONE) and NOWARNING.","fixText":"Ensure that WRITE and/or greater access to CA1 Tape management STC data sets is limited to systems programmers and/or CA1 Tape management STC(s) and/or batch user(s) only. READ access can be given to auditors.\n\n(Note: The data sets and/or data set prefixes identified below are examples of a possible installation. The actual data sets and/or prefixes are determined when the product is actually installed on a system through the product's installation guide and can be site specific.)\n\nData sets to be protected will be: \nCA1.TMS*  (Data sets that are altered by the product's STCs, this can be more specific.)\n\nThe following commands are provided as a sample for implementing data set controls: \n\nAd 'SYS3.CA1.TMS*.**' UACC(NONW) OWNER(SYS3) -\n\tAUDIT(FAILURES(READ)) -\n\tDATA('CA1 STC DS')\n\nPE 'CA1.TMS*.**' ID(<syspaudt>  ACC(A)\nPE 'CA1.TMS*.**' ID (<Tape Management STCs and/or batch users >) ACC(A)\nPE 'CA1.TMS*.**' ID (<audtaudt>)  ACC(R)","ccis":["CCI-001499"]},{"vulnId":"V-224452","ruleId":"SV-224452r1144676_rule","severity":"medium","ruleTitle":"CA 1 Tape Management TMC, AUDIT and optional RDS and VPD data sets will be properly protected.","description":"CA 1 Tape Management TMC and AUDIT and optional data sets control the operations and access to the tape management system, and site specific information regarding tape volumes. Unauthorized access to these data sets could threaten the integrity and availability of the CA 1 Tape Management System, and compromise the confidentiality of customer data.","checkContent":"Refer to the following report produced by the Data Set and Resource Data Collection:\n\n- SENSITVE.RPT(CA1RPT).\n\nAutomated Analysis\nRefer to the following report produced by the Data Set and Resource Data Collection:\n\n- PDI(ZCA10003).\n\nVerify that all CA 1 Tape Management TMC, AUDIT and optional RDS and VPD data sets are properly protected. If the following guidance is true, this is not a finding.\n\nThe RACF data set access authorizations restricts READ access to application support personnel, production control and scheduling personnel, operations personnel, and auditors.\n\nThe RACF data set access authorizations restricts WRITE and/or greater access to only systems programming personnel and tape management personnel.\n\nThe RACF data set access authorizations restricts UPDATE access is limited to CA 1 batch production jobs, and CA 1 started tasks.\n\nThe RACF data set access authorizations specify that all (i.e., failures and successes) ALTER access are logged.\n\nThe RACF data set access authorizations specify UACC(NONE) and NOWARNING.","fixText":"The ISSO will ensure that WRITE and/or greater access to CA 1 TMC, AUDIT and optional RDS and VPD data sets are limited to only systems programming personnel and tape management personnel. UPDATE access can be given to CA 1 STCs and/or batch users. READ access can be given to application support personnel, production control and scheduling personnel, operations personnel, and auditors. ALTER access will be logged.\n\nThe installing systems programmer will identify and document the product data sets and categorize them according to who will have WRITE and/or greater access and if required that all WRITE and/or greater access is logged. The installing systems programmer will identify if any additional groups have WRITE and/or greater access for specific data sets, and once documented will work with the ISSO to ensure they are properly restricted to the ACP (Access Control Program) active on the system.\n\n(Note: The data sets and/or data set prefixes identified below are examples of a possible installation. The actual data sets and/or prefixes are determined when the product is actually installed on a system through the product's installation guide and can be site specific.)\n\nDue to the unique file structure of the TMC and Audit data sets, CA 1 uses the YSVC programs to handle all direct I/O activity. Because standard OPEN/CLOSE macros are not used, typical data set security checks are not performed. Even if a user does not have READ access to these data sets, the YSVC programs can enable that user to read and update records within these files. Therefore, control READ access to the TMC and Audit data sets by the YSVCUNCD and YSVCCOND resource names. Typical users should be restricted to conditional READ access.\n\nRestrict CA 1 batch production jobs, and CA 1 started tasks to the following access authority:  Unconditional READ and UPDATE access to the TMC, Audit, Retention, and Vault Pattern Description data sets. Note: READ and UPDATE access to the TMC and Audit data sets are controlled by the YSVCUNCD and YSVCCOND resource names, and by standard ACP data set controls, because some CA 1 utilities use conventional OPEN/CLOSE methods.\n\nThe following commands are provided as a sample for implementing data set controls:\n\nad 'SYS3.CA1.AUDIT.**' uaac(none) owner(SYS3) -\n\taudit(success(alter) failures(read))\nad 'SYS3.CA1.RDS.**' uaac(none) owner(SYS3) -\n\taudit(success(alter) failures(read))\nad 'SYS3.CA1.TMC.**' uaac(none) owner(SYS3) -\n\taudit(success(alter) failures(read))\nad 'SYS3.CA1.VPD.**' uaac(none) owner(SYS3) -\n\taudit(success(alter) failures(read))\n\npe 'SYS3.CA1.AUDIT.**' id(<audtaudt>) acc(r)\npe 'SYS3.CA1.AUDIT.**' id(<operaudt>) acc(r)\npe 'SYS3.CA1.AUDIT.**' id(<pcspaudt>) acc(r)\npe 'SYS3.CA1.AUDIT.**' id(CA1 STCs) acc(u)\npe 'SYS3.CA1.AUDIT.**' id(<syspaudt>) acc(a)\npe 'SYS3.CA1.AUDIT.**' id(<tapeaudt>) acc(a)\npe 'SYS3.CA1.AUDIT.**' id(<tstcaudt>) acc(a)\npe 'SYS3.CA1.RDS.**' id(<syspaudt>) acc(a)\npe 'SYS3.CA1.RDS.**' id(<tapeaudt>) acc(a)\npe 'SYS3.CA1.RDS.**' id(<tstcaudt>) acc(a)\npe 'SYS3.CA1.TMC.**' id(<appsaudt>) acc(r)\npe 'SYS3.CA1.TMC.**' id(<audtaudt>) acc(r)\npe 'SYS3.CA1.TMC.**' id(<operaudt>) acc(r)\npe 'SYS3.CA1.TMC.**' id(<pcspaudt>) acc(r)\npe 'SYS3.CA1.TMC.**' id(CA1 STCs) acc(u)\npe 'SYS3.CA1.TMC.**' id(<syspaudt>) acc(a)\npe 'SYS3.CA1.TMC.**' id(<tapeaudt>) acc(a)\npe 'SYS3.CA1.TMC.**' id(<tstcaudt>) acc(a)\npe 'SYS3.CA1.VPD.**' id(<syspaudt>) acc(a)\npe 'SYS3.CA1.VPD.**' id(<tapeaudt>) acc(a)\npe 'SYS3.CA1.VPD.**' id(<tstcaudt>) acc(a)","ccis":["CCI-001499","CCI-002234"]},{"vulnId":"V-224453","ruleId":"SV-224453r1144678_rule","severity":"medium","ruleTitle":"CA 1 Tape Management command resources must be properly defined and protected.","description":"CA 1 Tape Management can run with sensitive system privileges, and potentially can circumvent system controls. Failure to properly control access to product resources could result in the compromise of the operating system environment, and compromise the confidentiality of customer data. Many utilities assign resource controls that can be granted to systems programmers only in greater than read authority. Resources are also granted to certain non systems personnel with read only authority.\n\nOn-line applications offer the capabilities to directly access the CA 1 Tape Management Catalog (TMC) for query and update purposes. CA 1 special tape handling privileges offer the ability to process special tape requirements, such as BLP and foreign tapes. Uncontrolled access to these CA 1 features and facilities may threaten the integrity and availability of the CA 1 tape management system, and compromise the confidentiality of customer data.","checkContent":"Refer to the following report produced by the Data Set and Resource Data Collection:\n\n- SENSITVE.RPT(CA@MD).\n\nAutomated Analysis\nRefer to the following report produced by the Data Set and Resource Data Collection:\n\n- PDI(ZCA10020).\n\nVerify that all CA 1 command resources are properly protected according to the requirements specified in CA 1 Command Resources table in the z/OS STIG Addendum. If the following guidance is true, this is not a finding.\n\nThe RACF resource access authorizations restrict access to the appropriate personnel as designated in the above table.\n\nThe RACF resource logging is specified as designated in the above table.\n\nThe RACF resource rules for the resources designated in the above table specify UACC(NONE) and NOWARNING.\n\nA Deny-By-Default entry of \"**\" is defined with UACC(NONE) and no Access Granted.","fixText":"Ensure that the CA 1 Tape Management command resource access is in accordance with those outlined in CA 1 Command Resources table in the zOS STIG Addendum.\n\nUse CA 1 Command Resources and CA 1 Command Resources for RACF tables in the zOS STIG Addendum. These tables list the resources, access requirements, and the resource class for CA 1 Command Resources; ensure the following guidelines are followed:\n\nThe RACF resource access authorizations restrict access to the appropriate personnel as designated in the above table.\n\nThe RACF resource logging is specified as designated in the above table.\n\nThe RACF resource rules for the resources designated in the above table specify UACC(NONE) and NOWARNING.\n\nA Deny-By-Default entry of \"**\" is defined with UACC(NONE) and no Access Granted. \nThe following commands are provided as a sample for implementing resource controls:\n\nRDEFINE CA@MD L0DELETE UACC(NONE) OWNER(ADMIN) AUDIT(FAILURE(READ))\nPERMIT L0DELETE CLASS(CA@MD) ACCESS(READ) ID(tapeaudt)","ccis":["CCI-000213","CCI-002234"]},{"vulnId":"V-224454","ruleId":"SV-224454r1144680_rule","severity":"medium","ruleTitle":"CA 1 Tape Management function and password resources must be properly defined and protected.","description":"CA 1 Tape Management can run with sensitive system privileges, and potentially can circumvent system controls. Failure to properly control access to product resources could result in the compromise of the operating system environment, and compromise the confidentiality of customer data. Many utilities assign resource controls that can be granted to systems programmers only in greater than read authority. Resources are also granted to certain non systems personnel with read only authority.\n\nCA 1 online applications offer the capabilities to directly access the CA 1 Tape Management Catalog (TMC) for query and update purposes. CA 1 special tape handling privileges offer the ability to process special tape requirements, such as BLP and foreign tapes. Uncontrolled access to these CA 1 features and facilities may threaten the integrity and availability of the CA 1 tape management system, and compromise the confidentiality of customer data.","checkContent":"Refer to the following report produced by the Data Set and Resource Data Collection:\n\n- SENSITVE.RPT(CA@APE).\n\nRefer to the following report produced by the z/OS Data Collection:\n\n- CA1RPT(TMSSECAB).\n- CA1RPT(TMSTMVT) - for r11.5 and below.\n- CA1RPT(TMOOPTxx) - for r12.0 and above.\n- CA1RPT(TMOSECxx) - for r12.6 and above.\n\nAutomated Analysis requiring additional analysis\nRefer to the following report produced by the Data Set and Resource Data Collection:\n\n- PDI(ZCA10021).\n\nVerify that all CA 1 function and password resources are properly protected according to the requirements specified in the CA 1 Function and Password Resources table in the z/OS STIG Addendum. If the following guidance is true, this is not a finding.\n\nThe RACF resource access authorizations restrict access to the appropriate personnel as designated in the above table.\n\nThe RACF resource logging is specified as designated in the above table.\n\nThe RACF resource rules for the resources designated in the above table specify UACC(NONE) and NOWARNING.\n\nA Deny-By-Default entry of \"**\" is defined with UACC(NONE) and no Access Granted. \n\nNote: CA 1 password resources may require additional analysis to ensure access authorization is justified. CA 1 system password is obtained at offset x'18' from the beginning of module TMSTMVT for r11.5 and below and SHUTDWN option specified in the TMOOPTxx for r12.0 and above. CA 1 Online User Passwords can be obtained from TMSSECAB for all releases or TMOSECxx, if present, for r12.6 and above.","fixText":"Ensure that the CA 1 function and password resource access is in accordance with those outlined in CA 1 Function and Password Resources table in the zOS STIG Addendum.\n\nUse CA 1 Function and Password Resources and CA 1 Function and Password Resources for RACF tables in the zOS STIG Addendum. These tables list the resources, access requirements, and the resource class for CA 1 Function and Password Resources; ensure the following guidelines are followed:\n\nThe RACF resource access authorizations restrict access to the appropriate personnel as designated in the above table.\n\nThe RACF resource logging is specified as designated in the above table.\n\nThe RACF resource rules for the resources designated in the above table specify UACC(NONE) and NOWARNING.\n\nA Deny-By-Default entry of \"**\" is defined with UACC(NONE) and no Access Granted.\n\nThe following commands are provided as a sample for implementing resource controls:\n\nRDEFINE CA@APE BLPRES UACC(NONE) OWNER(ADMIN) AUDIT(ALL(READ)) \nPERMIT BLPRES CLASS(CA@APE) ACCESS(UPDATE) ID(tapeaudt)\nPERMIT BLPRES CLASS(CA@APE) ACCESS(UPDATE) ID(syspaudt)","ccis":["CCI-000213","CCI-002234"]},{"vulnId":"V-224455","ruleId":"SV-224455r1144682_rule","severity":"medium","ruleTitle":"CA 1 Tape Management Started Task name will be properly identified and/or defined to the system ACP.","description":"CA 1 Tape Management requires a started task that will be restricted to certain resources, data sets, and other system functions. Defining the started task as a userid to the system ACP allows the ACP to control the access and authorized users that require these capabilities. Failure to properly control these capabilities could compromise the operating system environment, ACP, and customer data.","checkContent":"Refer to the following report produced by the RACF Data Collection:\n\n- RACFCMDS.RPT(LISTUSER).\n\nVerify that the userid(s) for the CA 1 Tape Management started task(s) is (are) properly defined. If the following attributes are defined, this is not a finding.\n\nPROTECTED","fixText":"The ISSO working with the systems programmer will ensure the CA 1 Tape Management Started Task(s) is properly identified and/or defined to the System ACP. \n\nIf the product requires a Started Task, verify that it is properly defined to the System ACP with the proper attributes.\n\nMost installation manuals will indicate how the Started Task is identified and any additional attributes that must be specified.\n\nThe following commands are provided as a sample for defining Started Task(s):\n\nau TMSINIT name('STC, CA 1 Tape Management') owner(stc) dfltgrp(stc) nopass -\n\tdata('Start CA1 TMS')\nau CTS name('STC, CA 1 Common Tape System') owner(stc) dfltgrp(stc) nopass -\n\tdata(' CA Common Tape Service for CA1 - used to create tape labels')","ccis":["CCI-000764"]},{"vulnId":"V-224456","ruleId":"SV-224456r1145198_rule","severity":"medium","ruleTitle":"CA 1 Tape Management Started task will be properly defined to the STARTED resource class for RACF.","description":"Access to product resources must be restricted to only individuals responsible for the application connectivity and who have a requirement to access these resources. Improper control of product resources could compromise the operating system, ACP, and customer data.","checkContent":"Refer to the following report produced by the RACF Data Collection:\n\n- DSMON.RPT(RACSPT).\n\nAutomated Analysis\nRefer to the following report produced by the RACF Data Collection:\n\n- PDI(ZCA10032).\n\nIf the CA 1 Tape Management started task(s) is (are) defined to the STARTED resource class profile and/or ICHRIN03 table entry, this is not a finding.","fixText":"The ISSO working with the systems programmer will ensure the CA 1 Tape Management Started Task(s) is properly identified and/or defined to the System ACP.\n\nA unique userid must be assigned for the CA 1 Tape Management started task(s) thru a corresponding STARTED class entry.\n\nThe following commands are provided as a sample for defining Started Task(s):\n\nrdef started TMSINIT.** uacc(none) owner(admin) audit(all(read)) -\n\tstdata(user(TMSINIT) group(stc))\nrdef started CTS.** uacc(none) owner(admin) audit(all(read)) -\n\tstdata(user(CTS) group(stc))\nsetr racl(started) ref","ccis":["CCI-000764"]},{"vulnId":"V-224457","ruleId":"SV-224457r1144686_rule","severity":"medium","ruleTitle":"CA 1 Tape Management Resource Class will be defined or active in the ACP.","description":"Failure to use a robust ACP to control a product could potentially compromise the integrity and availability of the MVS operating system and user data.","checkContent":"Refer to the following report produced by the RACF Data Collection:\n\n- RACFCMDS.RPT(SETROPTS).\n- DSMON.RPT(RACCDT) - Alternate list of active resource classes.\n\nAutomated Analysis\nRefer to the following report produced by the RACF Data Collection:\n\n- PDI(ZCA10038).\n\nIf the CA 1 Tape Management resource class(es) is (are) active, this is not a finding.","fixText":"Ensure that the following CA 1 Tape Management Resource Class(es) is (are) active.\n\nCA@CMD\nCA@APE\n\nUse the following commands as an example:\n\nSETROPTS CLASSACT(CA@CMD,CA@APE)","ccis":["CCI-000336","CCI-002358"]},{"vulnId":"V-224458","ruleId":"SV-224458r1145200_rule","severity":"medium","ruleTitle":"CA 1 Tape Management external security options must be specified properly.","description":"CA 1 Tape Management offers multiple external security interfaces that are controlled by parameters specified in TMOOPT00. These interfaces provide security controls for several CA 1 system and user functions. Without proper controls of these sensitive functions, the integrity of the CA 1 Tape Management System and the confidentiality of data stored on tape volumes may be compromised.","checkContent":"Refer to the following report produced by the z/OS Data Collection:\n\n- CA1RPT(TMSSTATS).\n\nAutomated Analysis\nRefer to the following report produced by the z/OS Data Collection:\n\n- PDI(ZCA10040).\n\nCA 1 external security utilizing RACF is accomplished in the manner described in this section.\n\nNote: The TMOOPTxx member is specified in the TMOSYSxx member in the data set allocated by the TMSPARM DD statement in the TMSINIT STC. By default, the suffix 00 is used for these members. However, overrides can be specified by PARM value(s) on the EXEC statement in the TMSINIT STC and/or in the TMOSYSxx member.\n\nReview the options and values of the below CA 1 parameters. If the options are set to the specified value, this is not a finding.\n\nCA 1 SECURITY OPTIONS - RACF\nOption\tStandard Value\nBATCH\tYES obsolete as of r12.0\nCATSEC\tNO obsolete as of r12.0\nCMD\tYES\nCREATE\tsee Note 1\nDSNB\tYES\nFUNC\tYES see Note 2\nOCEOV\tNO see Note 3\nPMASK\tDo not specify or change\nPSWD\tYES\nSCRTCH\tNO\nSECWTO\tYES\nUNDEF\tFAIL\nUX0AUPD\tNO see Note 4\nYSVC\tYES\n\nNote 1: The CREATE parameter defines the level of access that is required to create a data set on tape. The default value is UPDATE. However, the vendor recommends the value be set to CREATE if running CA Top Secret or ACF2 and ALTER if you are running RACF.\n\nNote 2: The FUNC option provides supplementary security for BLP access. The tape label bypass privilege must still be specified in the RACF userid record to allow access to BLP processing.\n\nNote 3: The vendor recommends that OCEOV be set to NO and the RACF SETROPTS option TAPEDSN be active. Be advised that if OCEOV is disabled and RACF TAPEDSN is not active, tape data set protection will not be in effect.\n\nNote 4: The UX0AUPD will specify YES only if you alter the fields in the TMC and the TMSUXxA (for r11.5 and below) or TMSXITA (for r12.0 and above) is changed.","fixText":"The systems programmer/ISSO will ensure that the CA 1 external security options are specified in accordance with the ACP being used. CA 1 Tape Management ACP security interfaces are controlled by options coded in the TMOOPTxx member identified in the TMOSYSxx member of the data set allocated by the TMSPARM DD statement in the TMSINIT STC. The specific required option settings are dependent on the ACP in use on the system.\n\nCA 1 SECURITY OPTIONS - RACF\nOPTION\tSTANDARD VALUE\nBATCH\tYES obsolete as of r12.0\nCATSEC\tNO obsolete as of r12.0\nCMD\tYES\nCREATE\tsee note 1\nDSNB\tYES\nFUNC\tYES see note 2\nOCEOV\tNO see note 3\nPMASK\tDo not specify or change\nPSWD\tYES\nSCRTCH\tNO\nSECWTO\tYES\nUNDEF\tFAIL\nUX0AUPD\tNO see note 4\nYSVC\tYES\n\nNote 1       The CREATE parameter defines the level of access that is required to create a data set on tape. The default value is UPDATE. However, the vendor recommends the value be set to CREATE if you are running CA Top Secret or ACF2 and ALTER if you are running RACF.\n\nNote 2\tThe FUNC option provides supplementary security for BLP access. The tape label bypass privilege must still be specified in the ACF2 user LID record to allow access to BLP processing.\n\nNote 3\tThe vendor recommends that OCEOV be set to NO and the RACF SETROPTS option TAPEDSN be active. Be advised that if OCEOV is disabled and RACF TAPEDSN is not active, tape data set protection will not be in effect.\n\nNote 4\tThe UX0AUPD will specify YES only if you alter the fields in the TMC and the TMSUXxA (for r11.5 and below) or TMSXITA (for r12.0 and above) is changed.","ccis":["CCI-000381"]}]}